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Abstract—Networking on white spaces (i.e., locally unused
spectrum) relies on active monitoring of spectrum usage. Spec-
trum databases based on empirical radio propagation models
are widely adopted but shown to be error-prone, since they do
not account for built environments (e.g., trees and man-made
buildings). As an alternative, crowd-sensed radio mapping by
mobile clients who acquire local spectrum data and transmit
it to a central aggregator (platform) for processing, results in
more accurate radio maps. Success of such crowd-sensing systems
presumes some incentive mechanisms to attract user participa-
tion. In this work, we assume that the platform who constructs
radio environment maps makes one-time offers (the incentive for
participation) to users, and collects data from those who accept
the offers. We design pricing mechanisms based on expected utility
(EU) maximization, where EU captures the tradeoff between radio
mapping performance (location and data quality), crowd-sensing
cost and uncertainty in offer outcomes (i.e., possible expiration
and rejection). Specifically, we consider both sequential offering,
where one best price offer is sent to the best user in each
round, and batched offering, where a batch of offers is made
in each round. For the later, we show that EU is submodular
in the discrete domain, and propose a mechanism that first
fixes the pricing rule, and selects users based on Unconstrained
Submodular Maximization (USM); it then compares different
pricing rules to find the best batch of offers in each round. We
show that USM-based user selection has provable performance
guarantee. Proposed mechanisms are evaluated and compared
against utility-maximization-based baseline mechanisms.
Index Terms—Radio Environment Mapping, Spatial Statistics,
Crowd-Sensing, Pricing Mechanism, Expected Utility Maximiza-
tion, Unconstrained Submodular Maximization.
I. INTRODUCTION
The exponential increase in mobile data traffic has naturally
translated into similar demands for wireless network capacity
for broadband access. A significant portion of spectrum is
allocated via licensing for various services (e.g., TV broad-
casting, radar and satellite services), but is often under-
utilized in practice. To improve spectrum utilization, the FCC
allows unlicensed users to opportunistically access locally idle
licensed spectrum, aka White Spaces (WS), subject to the no-
harmful-interference constraint [2].
A key step of WS networking is to actively monitor spec-
trum usage locally and identify WS opportunities. Currently,
empirical radio propagation models are widely used and im-
plmented in spectrum databases [3]–[6] for this purpose, but
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recent studies [7]–[9] have shown that they are often locally
inaccurate since they do not account for built environments
like trees and man-made buildings. To augment spectrum
databases, radio mapping via spatial statistics (e.g., Kriging
[9]–[11] and Gaussian Process (GP) [12], [13]) has been
proposed, which leverages local measured RSSI1 data and
provides accurate RSSI estimation at unmeasured locations.
RSSI data collection requires campaigns like drive tests,
which are time- and labor-intensive for monitoring a wide area.
Deploying specialized spectrum sensors is a second option, but
large-scale deployment is typically costly in proportion to the
hardware and deployment expenses. An economically viable
alternative is crowd-sensing with commodity mobile devices
that are enabled to do such spectrum sensing, i.e., outsourcing
sensing tasks opportunistically to mobile users with clients
embedded with such sensing devices. However, since users
consume resources (e.g., battery, CPU and memory) for sens-
ing, they need to be properly compensated or incentivized.
Crowd-sensed radio mapping is different from other crowd-
sensing applications [14]–[16] in several ways. First, it sam-
ples the (unknown) RSSI field (opportunistically) at reported
user locations at a time instant (or within a short duration), and
applies spatial statistics to estimate RSSI values at unmeasured
locations. Therefore, to obtain a RSSI estimate at a target
location that is not sampled, only the relative positioning of
selected users (and the local spatial statistical model used
for interpolation) matters. Second, user devices are hetero-
geneous (e.g. various smartphones and tablets from different
manufacturers and even different model families from the
same manufacturer) and naturally provide data of different
quality due to manufacturing variances and specifically, noise
figure of the underlying circuit design, which needs to be
accounted in our spatial interpolation. Third, user devices are
not dedicated to sensing but share resources (CPU cycles and
battery notably) with many other tasks. Hence, in addition
to energy or battery costs, users will incur opportunity costs
depending on current device statuses, which is the loss of
utility if they decide to spend resources on sensing instead
of other tasks.
In this work, we consider pricing [17]–[19] for crowd-
sensed radio mapping. Given a spatial statistical model, the
platform determines the value of a set of users based on
location, data quality and its own preferences, which is the
amount (of money) it is willing to pay. Each user has a
private sensing cost (i.e., sum of energy and opportunity costs).
Selected users receive one-time price offers and have only
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one chance to make a decision (either accept or reject) by
a given deadline; otherwise, the offer will be expired. Here,
we consider rational users who accept offers if its sensing
cost is no greater than the offered price. Those who accept
offers perform sensing at reported locations, upload data and
receive payments. Therefore, from the platform’s perspective,
a set of users is associated with a utility or gain, which is the
difference between value and total payment. Due to possible
offer expiration (due to network congestion etc.) and rejection,
the platform aims to maximize the expected utility (EU) by
determining who to send offers to (i.e., user selection) and
how much to offer (i.e., price determination).
Our primary contributions are as follows:
• We design a crowd-sensing system that periodically ac-
quires spectrum data from users for radio mapping.
• We introduce EU and formulate pricing mechanism de-
sign as EU maximization. We first propose sequential
offering, where the platform sends out the best offer to
the best user in each round, and keeps offering until the
next one is no longer profitable. Then we generalize it
to batched (i.e., single-batch and multi-batch) offering,
where a batch of multiple offers are made in each round.
• For batched offering, we show that EU is submodular
in the discrete domain. We propose a pricing mechanism
that first fixes the pricing rule, and selects users based
on Unconstrained Submodular Maximization (USM); it
compares different pricing rules to find the best batch
of offers that maximizes EU (instead of the best-case
utility) in each round. We adopt the linear-time determin-
istic USM algorithm that provides a 1/3-approximation
guarantee [20] for user selection. In practice, however,
EU is difficult to analytically evaluate and Monte-Carlo
estimated EU is fed to the algorithm. We show that its
worst-case performance is degraded by estimation errors,
and the reduced amount grows linearly in the number of
users given the maximum estimation error (Theorem 1).
• We conduct simulations to evaluate the proposed EU-
maximization-based mechanisms, and further compare
them against baseline mechanisms that aim to find the
best batch of offers that maximize the best-case utility in
each round. Results show that our single-batch mecha-
nism is better than the single-batch baseline mechanism
with an improvement ranging from 8.5% to 40.5%. If
more batches are allowed, our multi-batch mechanism
achieves close performance with the multi-batch baseline
mechanism, but requires much fewer batches (2.5 versus
7.7 batches on average) and thus a much smaller delay.
Sequential offering works better than the single-batch
baseline mechanism, but has a very large cumulative
delay. Offer expiration adversely affected all mechanisms,
but sequential and multi-batch offering are more robust.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review
related work in Section II and provide a two-user tutorial
example in Section III. In Section IV, we provide background
on submodularity and present our models. Our pricing mecha-
nisms are presented in Section V and evaluated in Section VI.
We conclude this study in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
In recent years, spatial-statistics-based radio mapping has
been proposed to better capture local radio environments to
augment spectrum databases. In [21], Phillips et al. applied a
statistical interpolation technique called Ordinary Kriging to
map the coverage of WiMax networks. Similar techniques have
been applied to estimate the coverage area of single-transmitter
[9] and multi-transmitter networks [11] in TV bands. A more
detailed discussion is available in [22].
Radio mapping requires a large amount of sensing data, and
incentivized crowd-sensing is considered as an economically
viable option. A number of various incentive mechanisms have
been proposed. In [14], Yang et al. studied a platform-centric
incentive model, where users share the reward proportionally
in a Stackelberg game. In mechanisms based on reserve auc-
tion [14], [23], [24], users bid for tasks and receive payments
no less than bids when selected. One main goal for the plat-
form is to design a truthful mechanism that motivates users to
bid at their true private costs. In [15], Koutsopoulos designed
an incentive mechanism to determine participation level and
payment allocation to minimize platform’s compensation cost
with guaranteed service quality. Other models include all-
pay auction [25], Bayesian models [15], Tullock contests [26]
and posted pricing [17], [19], [27]. Some are proposed in an
online setting with constraints like budget limits [27]–[29],
where users arrive in a random order and a typical goal is to
maximize a certain objective (e.g., revenue).
Incentive mechanisms are typically tailored to the crowd-
sensing application being considered by incorporating factors
like user location, data quality and user availability etc. As
an example, in [23], each task has a specific location tag and
each user can only compete for tasks within its service region.
In [16], Peng et al. extended the well-known Expectation
Maximization algorithm to estimate the quality of sensing data
and incorporated it in determining rewards. In [19], Han et al.
studied a quality-aware Bayesian pricing problem where both
users’ sensing costs and qualities are random variables, drawn
from known distributions. The goal is to choose an appropriate
posted price to recruit a group of users with reasonable sensing
quality, and minimize the total expected payment. If users
need to move to designated sensing locations or are available
at different time periods, then incentive mechanism design is
closely coupled with task allocation [18] or scheduling [30].
In this study, we consider incentive mechanism design in an
offline setting for crowd-sensed radio mapping, in which the
platform acquires data from a pool of users who are interested
and available for sensing in each period, and measurements are
taken at their current locations. We consider data quality in
terms of hardware quality, and incorporate it into the spatial
statistical model (i.e., GP). Distinct from the auction-based
incentive mechanism for crowd-sensed radio mapping [24],
we are interested in pricing mechanisms where the platform
makes one-time price offers to a set of selected users, and
collects data from those who accept offers. To select users and
determine corresponding price offers, we define utility for the
platform to trade the value it obtains from the resulting radio
map generated based on the offered data, against the total price
Fig. 1: Pricing-based crowd-sensing system. (1) In each period,
the platform first broadcasts a sensing task to users in the
area of interest. (2) Users who are interested and available for
sensing in the current period report location and device type.
(3) The platform determines and sends out one-time offers
to selected users. (4) If a selected user decides to accept the
offer, it performs the required sensing task. All selected users
will inform the platform of their decisions (and upload the
data) before the deadline. (5) The platform pays users who
contribute data.
(crowd-sensing cost), and use the notion of EU to account
for possible offer expiration and rejection. We formulate the
pricing mechanism design as EU maximization, and propose
mechanisms based on USM.
III. A TWO-USER TUTORIAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we first present our system architecture and
provide a two-user tutorial example to illustrate the basic idea
of pricing for crowd-sensed radio mapping.
A. System Architecture
As shown in Fig. 1, the platform acquires data periodically
from users. At the beginning of each period, the platform
broadcasts a sensing task to all users in the area of interest
(AoI) with specific sensing parameters (e.g., center frequency,
sampling rate and FFT bin size) to ensure a consistent sensing
procedure across different hardware. Note that the task does
not specify sensing locations for two reasons. First, there is no
need since the platform will take a sampling approach, that is,
selecting a subset of users after they provide their locations.
This is consistent with the underlying spatial statistical model,
where only the relative positioning (instead of absolute loca-
tions) that matters for the resulting radio map quality. Second,
it requires extra time and costs for users to move to target
sensing locations, which means extra incentivization costs for
the platform and added complexity for mechanism design2. To
avoid excessive delay due to communication delay or failure,
network congestion etc., each offer has a deadline, by which
a decision has to be received by the platform (along with the
data if accepted); otherwise, the offer will be expired.
In this study, we assume no entry or other overhead costs,
that is, a user does not incur a fee to communicate with the
platform. We consider users of low mobility (e.g., pedestrians),
who are honest in providing their information and following
the protocol. We assume small displacements between reported
locations and eventual sensing locations. We will leave the
high-mobility case and security considerations as future work.
2See [18] for more discussions on allocation of tasks with specific locations.
B. A Two-User Scenario
Fig. 2 illustrates the topology of the two-user example. The
goal of the platform is to estimate the RSSI Z(x) (in dBm) at
each location x ∈ U , where U represents the discretized AoI.
There are two users S = {1, 2} at x1 and x2 in the AoI. In
each period, each user will incur a sensing cost ci > 0 and
receive an offer pi > 0, when selected by the platform. We
assume rational users, who accept the offer if ci ≤ pi, and
reject it otherwise. In the following discussion, we assume no
expired offers and will consider them later in Section V.
Fig. 2: Topology of the two-user example. The AoI is dis-
cretized into a mesh grid of 9 points (blue dots). User 1 is at
(−0.5, 0), and user 2 is at (0.5, 0) or (0.5,−0.5).
The platform has a valuation function v : 2S 7→ R+ and a
pricing function p : 2S 7→ R+. For each set of users A, there is
an associated value v(A) and a total price of all offers p(A) =∑
i∈A pi (i.e., crowd-sensing cost for the platform), assuming
that each offer is unexpired and accepted. It makes sense for
the platform, as a rational decision maker, to maximize its
utility (or profit), i.e.,
max
A⊆S
u(A) = max
A⊆S
(v(A)− p(A)) , (1)
which is an important and widely used concept in economics
(e.g., rational choice theory [31]) and measures the platform’s
preference over the set of users A. For convenience, we also
write v(A), p(A) and u(A) as vA, pA and uA, respectively.
In practice, however, the probability that an offer is accepted
(and data is uploaded to the platform) by the deadline is less
than 1, due to possible expiration and rejection. Hence, only
a subset of users in A accept offers, and u(A) is essentially
the best-case utility. In this case, it makes more senses for
the platform to maximize the average-case or expected utility
(EU). More will be discussed later in this example.
C. How to Valuate Users
In this example, two RSSI data models are considered: one
ignoring shadowing and noise, and the other one is our GP-
based model that accounts for both. Both models assume that
any small-scale fading over small distances and time has been
averaged out via sensing.
1) Model I – Shadowing-Free, Noise-Free: This model
assumes a constant but unknown path-loss-impaired RSSI at
any location within the AoI. When there are no measurements,
both users are equally valuable, since either can provide
accurate estimation. Once one is recruited, a second user
has zero marginal value. Hence, we have v({1}) = v({2})
v(∅) v({1}) v({2}) v({1, 2})
Model I 0 4 4 4
Model II - Case 1 0 2.18 1.76 3.48
Model II - Case 2 0 2.18 2.23 3.82
TABLE I: Valuation of users in the two-user example.
= v({1, 2}) = v0, where v0 is the value (perceived by the
platform) of estimating RSSIs at U . We set v0 = 4 for later
calculations.
2) Model II (GP) – Shadowing-Aware, Noise-Aware: Under
this model, Z(x) for x ∈ U is the sum of path-loss-impaired
average RSSI µ(x) and spatially correlated shadowing δ(x) ∼
N(0, σ2x) with a covariance function K(d), where d is the
distance between two locations. Z(xi) for xi ∈ S represents
the noisy RSSI measured by user i, which includes additional
hardware noise i ∼ (0, σ2i) that is independent of shadowing.
Hence, RSSI at each location is modeled as a Gaussian random
variable, and RSSIs at S ∪U form a Gaussian random vector,
whose joint distribution (Eq. (8)) is defined by a mean vector
and a covariance matrix (Eq. (9)). More details about the
model will be provided in Section IV-B. Mutual information
MI(A) (Eq. (12)) is used to quantify radio mapping quality
of any subset of users A ⊆ S, and the valuation function v(A)
defined in Eq. (15) (with α = 0) is used to translate MI to
value that is comparable to payments.
We consider two cases under this model:
• Case 1: Users have different locations but provide data
of the same quality. Suppose x1 = (−0.5, 0), x2 =
(0.5, 0.5) and σ21 = σ
2
2 = 0.5.
• Case 2: Users have equally good (i.e., symmetric) loca-
tions but provide data of different quality. Suppose x1 =
(−0.5, 0), x2 = (0.5, 0) and σ21 = 0.5 > σ22 = 0.2.
For illustration, we set K(d) = 15.5 · exp(− d0.7 ) [9] (which
is consistent with our later simulations in Section VI) and set
the currency κ in v(A) to 10. Valuation of users under both
models is summarized in Table I.
The above highlights a few things. First, apart from the
platform’s preferences (e.g., choice of valuation function and
parameters like κ), the RSSI data model plays an important
role. Second, for a reasonable RSSI data model that considers
both shadowing and noise, user locations are important (e.g.,
Case 1 of Model II); data quality also matters and affects
valuation (e.g., Case 2 of Model II).
D. How to Select and Pay Users
At this point, v(·) is available to the platform (Table I). The
next step is to select a subset of users and determine their
price offers. This process is called “incentivizing”.
1) Deterministic Cost: If user devices are treated as spe-
cialized spectrum sensors, then sensing costs are dominated
by energy (or battery) costs [32]. In this case, it is reasonable
to assume deterministic sensing costs, which can be inferred
from the task and device type. Since the platform knows {ci},
it can set p{i} = ci to minimize payments while guaranteeing
offer acceptance, and search for the best set of users.
Suppose c1 = 2 and c2 = 1.5. Then p{1} = 2, p{2} = 1.5
and p{1,2} = 3.5. It is easy to see that A∗ = {2} leads to
the maximum utility in each case. If c1 = c2 = 1.5, we have
p{1} = p{1} = 1.5 and p{1,2} = 3. Under Model I, selecting
either user will lead to a maximum utility of 2.5 but not both.
In Case 1 of Model II, the platform is better off with A∗ =
{1}, while it better selects both in Case 2 of Model II. Hence,
selecting more users does not necessarily leads to a higher
utility, since it also means a higher cost for the platform.
2) Random Cost with Known Distributions: In crowd-
sensing, however, a user incurs an additional opportunity cost,
i.e., the loss of potential gain when the user decides to spend
resources on sensing instead of other tasks. It depends on the
task and device status that varies over time. Hence, the per-
ceived sensing cost in each period consists of a deterministic
energy cost and a random opportunity cost.
In this case, it makes sense to model user i’s sensing cost as
a continuous random variable Ci in [ci, c¯i], where c¯i ≥ ci > 0
and ci is the minimum energy cost. Random variables {Ci} are
independent of each other. Since device status is considered
sensitive information, Ci is private and only user i knows
its realization in each period, ci, by evaluating the task and
current device status3. We assume that the platform has only a
priori probabilistic knowledge of Ci. Let fCi(ci) and FCi(ci)
be the probability density function (PDF) and corresponding
cumulative density function (CDF), respectively. The PDF and
ci, c¯i could be learned by the platform from the empirical
distribution out of prior cost declarations by users of the
same device type, or from its long-term interaction with users
(e.g., whether or not accept an offer with a known price). If
such prior information is absent, Ci may be assumed to be
uniformly distributed over [ci, c¯i]. Hence, it is reasonable to
assume that the platform can infer fCi(ci) or FCi(ci) based
on the reported device type.
Since the platform does not know {ci}, it needs to consider
possible offer rejections. For A = {1} or {2}, the uncertainty
in user decisions implies the following utility,
u{i} =
{
v{i} − p{i}, if user i accepts the offer
0, otherwise
, (2)
which is a Bernoulli random variable and the acceptance
probability is Pr(ci ≤ p{i}) =
∫ p{i}
ci
fCi(ci)dci = FCi(p{i}).
In this case, it makes more sense to consider the EU,
EU{i} = E[u{i}] = (v{i} − p{i})FCi(p{i}), (3)
and the platform wants to find p∗{i} that maximizes EU{i},
i.e., EU maximization. For A = {1, 2}, the EU is given by
EU{1,2} =(v{1,2} − p{1} − p{2})FC1(p{1})FC2(p{2}) (4)
+ (v{1} − p{1})FC1(p{1})(1− FC2(p{2}))
+ (v{2} − p{2})(1− FC1(p{1}))FC2(p{2}).
and the goal is to find p∗ = [p∗{1}, p
∗
{2}] that maximizes
EU{1,2}. Note that in general the platform does not have to
3 In practice, we would expect a crowd-sensing application to be installed and
running on users’ mobile devices, which has some function that estimates
the perceived sensing cost in each period based on the needed resources for
the sensing task and the current device status. Designing such a function
for sensing cost estimation will be of practical importance, not only to this
work, but also to many other crowd-sensing applications (e.g., [15]). But this
topic is out of the scope of this paper, and will be left as future work.
send out offers all at once and stop; it can send more backup
based on the knowledge of outcomes of previous offers.
Suppose that C1 ∼ U [1, 2] and C2 ∼ U [0.5, 1.5], where
U [·, ·] denotes the uniform distribution. For pricing, the plat-
form’s first thought could be setting p{i} = c¯i. Then following
reasoning is the same with the deterministic-cost case. A
natural generalization is to choose a desired probability of
acceptance4 γ ∈ [0, 1] and set p{i} = F−1Ci (γ) for each user
i, where F−1Ci (·) is the inverse CDF. Given γ, prices are fixed
and the platform wants to maximize the EU.
Taking Case 2 of Model II and γ = 0.95 as an example, we
have p{1} = 1.95, p{2} = 1.45, p{1,2} = 3.4, and A∗ = {2} is
the best with EU{2} = (2.23− 1.45) · 0.95 = 0.74 by Eq. (3)
and (4). Note that the platform may further consider user 1, if
user 2 rejects the offer. Then the overall EU with multi-batch
offering would be EU{2} + (1− γ)EU{1} > EU{2}.
Given A, γ can also be optimized in each batch. Taking Case
2 of Model II as an example, when A = {1}, EU{1} = (2.18−
(1 + γ))γ and γ∗ = 0.59, EU∗{1} = 0.35. Similarly, for A =
{2}, EU{2} = (2.23− (0.5 + γ))γ and γ∗ = 0.865, EU∗{2} =
0.75. When A = {1, 2}, we have EU{1,2} = −2.59γ2 +2.91γ
and γ∗ = 0.56, EU∗{1,2} = 0.82. In this case, instead of using
the same γ, the platform can also choose {γi} for each user
separately, and maximizing Eq. (4) leads to γ∗1 = 0.37, γ
∗
2 =
0.76 and the resulting EU∗{1,2} = 0.87.
As we can see, the notation of utility accounts for locations,
data quality and sensing costs, and the notation of EU further
considers possible offer rejections. We can also see that user
selection and price determination are closely coupled in a
pricing mechanism. More will be discussed in Section V.
IV. PRELIMINARIES AND OUR MODEL
In this section, we first provide background on submodu-
larity. Then we present our spatial statistical model and define
the metric for measuring radio mapping performance. Finally,
we present our valuation model and explore its properties.
A. Preliminaries
The submodularity property is formally defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Submodularity). Let Ω be a finite set. A function
f : 2Ω 7→ R is submodular if for any A,B ⊆ Ω,
f(A) + f(B) ≥ f(A ∪B) + f(A ∩B). (5)
Equivalently [33], a function f is submodular if, for any
A ⊆ B ⊆ Ω and any i ∈ Ω \B,
f(A ∪ {i})− f(A) ≥ f(B ∪ {i})− f(B). (6)
The notion of submodularity captures diminishing returns
behaviors: adding a new element increases f more, if there
are fewer elements so far, and less, if there are more elements.
Definition 2 ((Approximately) monotonic function). Let Ω be
a finite set. A function f : 2Ω 7→ R is said to be monotone
4Compared to choosing the same desired price for all users, it makes more
sense to choose the same desired probability for all users, since users have
different cost distributions in general. If all user devices are of the same type,
then these two approaches are the same.
(or monotonic), if f(A∪{i})− f(A) ≥ 0 for any A ⊆ Ω and
any i ∈ Ω \A; f is said to be α-approximately monotonic, if
f(A ∪ {i})− f(A) ≥ −α for some small α > 0, and for any
A ⊆ Ω and any i ∈ Ω \A.
One of the most basic submodular maximization problems
is USM, which is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3 (USM). Given a nonnegative submodular fucn-
tion f : 2S 7→ R+, maxA⊆S f(A) is called Unconstrained
Submodular Maximization.
Algorithm 1: USM
input : S – ground set, f – nonnegative submodular
function
output: An (or Bn) – selected subset
1 A0 ← ∅, B0 ← S;
2 foreach i = 1 to n do
3 ai ← f(Ai−1 ∪ {ui})− f(Ai−1);
4 bi ← f(Bi−1 \ {ui})− f(Bi−1);
5 if ai ≥ bi then Ai ← Ai ∪ {ui}, Bi ← Bi−1 ;
6 else Ai ← Ai−1, Bi ← Bi−1 \ {ui} ;
7 return An (or equivalently Bn);
It is well known that USM is NP-hard [33], [34] and thus
heuristic-based algorithms are often used to find approximate
solutions. One state-of-art linear-time deterministic algorithm
is proposed in [20] and provided in Algorithm 1 for reference
in the rest of this work. It is essentially a greedy algorithm,
and achieves a 1/3-approximation, i.e., the algorithm obtains a
solution A with the guarantee that f(A) ≥ 13f(OPT ), where
OPT is the optimal solution.
B. Spatial Statistical Model – Gaussian Process (GP)
In this study, we employ GP [12], [13] (a generalization of
Kriging) for radio mapping. Let the set of n interested users be
S, and the finely discretized AoI be U , where |U |  |S| = n,
where | · | is the cardinality operator. Define V = S ∪ U and
each index i ∈ V corresponds to a location xi. Since the
platform obtains noisy RSSI measurements at S and wants to
estimate noiseless front-end RSSIs at U , the RSSI Z(xi) or
Zi is modeled as a Gaussian random variable in GP,
Z(xi) =
{
µ(xi) + δ(xi), for i ∈ U
µ(xi) + δ(xi) + i, for i ∈ S
, (dBm) (7)
where µ(xi) is path-loss-impaired RSSI, δ(xi) ∼ N(0, σ2xi) is
spatially correlated shadowing and i ∼ N(0, σ2i) is hardware
noise of user i’s device.
Define a kernel (or covariance) function K(·, ·) such that
K(i, j) is the covariance between δ(xi) and δ(xj). In GP, the
RSSIs at V form a Gaussian random vector ZV = [Z(xi)]i∈V
with a joint distribution of
fZV (zV ) =
1
(2pi)n/2|ΣV V |e
− 12 (zV −µV )TΣ−1V V (zV −µV ), (8)
where zV = [z(xi)]i∈V is a realization of ZV , µV =
[µ(xi)]i∈V is the mean vector and ΣV V is the covariance
matrix. For any pair of indices i, j ∈ V , their covariance σij
is the (i, j)-th entry of ΣV V , which is given by
σij =

K(i, j), if i 6= j
K(i, j) or σ2xi , if i = j ∈ U
K(i, j) + σ2i or σ2xi + σ2i , if i = j ∈ S
(9)
Given a set of measurements ZA where A ⊆ S, Z(xi) is a
conditional Gaussian random variable with a mean µZ(xi)|ZA
(or simply µi|A) and a variance of σ2Z(xi)|ZA (or simply σ
2
i|A),
µi|A = µ(xi) + ΣTAiΣ
−1
AA(zA − µA), (10)
σ2i|A = σii − ΣTAiΣ−1AAΣAi. (11)
Note that the posterior variance in Eq. (11) only depends on
ΣV V , not the actual measured values zA.
Estimating K(·, ·) can be difficult in practice, and it is often
assumed that K(·, ·) is stationary (i.e., a function of location
displacement) and isotropic (i.e., a function of distance). In
other words, K(i, j) = Kθ(||xi − xj ||), where θ is a set of
parameters. That being said, our following discussions do not
assume stationarity or isotropy, and thus can be applied to gen-
eral kernel functions. But we do assume both mean and kernel
functions have been estimated from previous measurements5
and available in the current period.
C. Mutual Information (MI) for Uncertainty Reduction
To measure radio mapping performance, we adopt the MI
metric [13], which is defined as follows,
MI(A) = I(ZA;ZV \A) = H(ZV \A)−H(ZV \A|ZA), (12)
which is the amount of uncertainty reduction about RSSIs at
unmeasured locations given measurements at A.
Note that the platform is interested in ZV \A, which includes
RSSIs at S \ A (i.e., locations with confirmed user presence)
and U (i.e., locations with possible user presence). As implic-
itly assumed in [13], Z(xi) includes noise for i ∈ S \A in the
definition of MI, which is not a big issue, since noise is rela-
tively small. Compared to the entropy criterion H(ZV \A|ZA),
MI tends to not select users along the boundaries and avoids
the “waste” of information.
Denote by MI(i|A) the marginal MI of an additional user
i ∈ S \A given A. It is given by
MI(i|A) = MI({i} ∪A)−MI(A) (13)
= H(Zi|ZA)−H(Zi|ZV \(A∪{i})), (14)
where H(Zi|ZA) = 12 log(2pieσ2i|A) is the conditional entropy,
and it can be easily computed from Eq. (11).
5In [21], authors used a predictive (empirical) path loss model to estimate the
mean process µ(x). This procedure is called detrending. In the same paper
as well as [9], authors estimated an empirical semivarigram γ(·) (isotropic
and stationary) from real measurements and fitted it with parametric models.
The relationship between γ(·) and K(·, ·) is K(i, j) = c0 − γ(||xi − xj ||)
for i 6= j, where c0 is some constant.
It has been shown in [13] that MI(A) is both submodular
and α-approximately monotone6. For any α > 0, a discretiza-
tion level exists so that MI(A) is approximately monotone.
D. Valuation Function
We consider the following valuation function v : 2S 7→ R+
for the platform,
v(A) = κ · log(1 +MI ′(A)), (15)
where κ > 0 is a constant and MI ′(A) = MI(A)+α|A|. Intu-
itively, κ is the currency that reflects the platform’s preference
over per unit MI (in log scale). Commonly used in economics,
log(·) further emphasizes the diminishing returns behavior. We
introduce α|A| to ignore the extreme case where some users
are arbitrarily close to each other, which rarely occurs and/or
can be avoided in practice (see Footnote 6).
We show that there exists useful structural properties like
submodularity and monotonicity in v(A).
Lemma 1. The valuation function v(·) in Eq. (15) is monotone
submodular.
Proof. See Appendix A-A for proof.
V. PRICING MECHANISM
In this section, we formulate pricing mechanism design as
expected utility (EU) maximization and propose two schemes:
(1) sequential offering and (2) batched offering.
A. EU Maximization
Given S, v(·) and {FCi(ci)}, the platform wants to deter-
mine a set of offers (A,p), where A ⊆ S are selected users
and p = [pi]i∈A is the corresponding price vector. Let the
decision of the i-the selected user be Xi, which is given by
Xi =
{
1, if ci ≤ pi (i.e., offer is accepted)
0, else (i.e., offer is rejected)
. (16)
It is a Bernoulli random variable (from the platform’s perspec-
tive), and Pr(Xi = 1) =
∫ pi
ci
fCi(ci)dci = FCi(pi).
As mentioned in Section III-A, an offer may be expired,
and this event is modeled by a random variable X ′i , i.e.,
X ′i =
{
1, if offer is unexpired
0, if offer is expired
, (17)
where ρi = Pr(X ′i = 1) is the probability of an unexpired
offer. We assume that the platform can estimate ρi and that
X ′i is independent of Xi.
6Intuitively, MI(A) is monotone under the condition that |V |  |S| ≥ |A|
and thus adding one more user increases the MI. Otherwise, consider the
example that S = {1, 2} and |V | = |S|, then MI(∅) = MI({1, 2}) = 0
but MI({1}) > 0 and MI({2}) > 0, which means that MI first increases
then decreases as more users are selected. Its monotonicity is approximate
due to the extreme case where there exist two (or more) users arbitrarily
close to each other. If one is selected, selecting the other one will decrease
MI. More discussions are available in [13]. In practice, the platform can
avoid such extreme cases by considering only one of them. Also, a pricing
mechanism that maximizes the (expected) utility should not select both, since
the second user is not beneficial for radio mapping and not free-of-charge.
Let Yi be a random variable that represents whether a user
is successfully recruited (i.e., offer is unexpired and accepted),
Yi =
{
1, if offer is unexpired AND accepted
0, if offer is expired OR rejected
, (18)
where
γi = Pr(Yi = 1) = Pr(X ′i = 1, Xi = 1)
= Pr(X ′i = 1) · Pr(Xi = 1|X ′i = 1)
= ρi · FCi(pi) ∈ [0, ρi], (19)
is the probability that the i-th selected user is recruited.
Define Y = [Yi]i∈A and let y be the realization of Y. Then
Ay ⊆ A is the set of recruited users. Then the EU is given by
EU(A,p) = EY[u(Ay,p)] =
∑
y
Pr(Ay,p)u(Ay,p), (20)
where
Pr(Ay,p) =
∏
i∈Ay
γi ·
∏
i/∈Ay
(1− γi), (21)
u(Ay,p) = v(Ay)−
∑
i∈Ay
pi, (22)
are the probability and utility of Ay given p, respectively.
The goal of the platform is to design a pricing mechanism
based on EU maximization, that is,
max
A⊆S,p
EU(A,p). (23)
In this sense, a pricing mechanism consists of a selection rule
and a pricing rule, which is joint optimization in the discrete
domain of A and the continuous domain of p.
B. Sequential Offering
We first consider a special case of EU maximization, where
|A| = 1. That is, the platform only selects one best user
with its best offer in each round, and waits for its decision
before making the next offer. We call it sequential (individual)
offering. Formally, the task in each round is
max
i∈S\A,pi
EU(A ∪ {i}, [p, pi]|Y = y), (24)
where y represents the outcomes of offers that have been sent
so far and is known to the platform.
The algorithm for sequential offering is described in Algo-
rithm 2. The idea is as follows: The platform first determines
an optimum price p∗i tailored to each i that maximizes EUi.
Then it picks the index i∗ that maximizes among the EUi,
and offers to that user the corresponding p∗i∗ .
1) Price Determination (Lines 3-5): Depending on whether
user i ∈ S \A is successfully recruited, the utility is
u(Ay ∪ {i}Yi , [p, pi])
= u(Ay,p) +
{
v(i|Ay)− pi, if Yi = 1
0, otherwise,
(25)
Algorithm 2: Sequential_Offering
input : S – set of users, v(·) – valuation function,
{FCi(·)} – cost distributions, {ρi} –
probabilities of unexpired offers, τ – threshold
output: A – selected users, p – prices, y – outcomes
1 A← ∅, p← NULL, y← NULL;
2 while A 6= S do
3 foreach each user i in S \A do
4 p∗i ← arg maxpi∈[ci,c¯i][v(i|Ay)− pi] · FCi(pi);
5 EUi ← [v(i|Ay)− p∗i ] · ρi · FCi(p∗i )
6 i∗ ← arg maxi∈S\AEUi;
7 while EUi∗ > τ do
8 Send the offer (i∗, p∗i∗) and observe yi∗ ;
9 A← A ∪ {i∗}, p← [p, p∗i∗ ], y← [y, yi∗ ];
10 if yi∗ = 1 then break;
11 else i∗ ← arg maxi∈S\AEUi ;
12 return A, p, y;
where v(i|Ay) = v({i} ∪Ay)− v(Ay) is the marginal value
of i given Ay. The task is to find
p∗i = arg max
pi∈[ci,c¯i]
EYi [u(Ay ∪ {i}Yi , [p, pi])]
= arg max
pi∈[ci,c¯i]
[v(i|Ay)− pi] · Pr(Yi = 1)
= arg max
pi∈[ci,c¯i]
[v(i|Ay)− pi] · FCi(pi). (26)
Note that ρi in Pr(Yi = 1) in Eq. (19) is a constant and
does not impact the choice of p∗i . If fCi(ci) = F
′
Ci
(ci) is
differentiable and non-increasing, the objective function in
Eq. (26) will be concave in pi, and p∗i can be obtained with
efficient algorithms (e.g., gradient descent). If FCi(ci) is twice
continuously differentiable, techniques like interval analysis
may be used to find p∗ [35].
2) User Selection (Line 6): The best user i∗ that maximizes
the EU is found,
i∗ = arg max
i∈S\A
[v(i|Ay)− p∗i ] · ρi · FCi(p∗i ). (27)
Note that the above selection also takes ρi into account. If
the user is recruited (Lines 10), the algorithm will go to Line
3 to recompute best prices for remaining users; otherwise, it
sends out the next best offer immediately until one is accepted
(Lines 7-11). To enable fast convergence, the platform can set
a minimum threshold τ > 0 (e.g., 0.01) for the marginal EU
(Line 7). The platform stops making offers when there are (1)
no remaining users or (2) none of the remaining users leads
to a non-trivial marginal EU.
3) Complexity Analysis: If we assume O(1) for computing
the best price for a single user, the overall computational
complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(n2), since it takes O(n) to
compute best prices for all remaining users and may select
up to n users in the worst case. The inner while-loop does
not require re-computation of best prices and is dominated by
the for-loop. Note that O(n2) is very conservative, since the
algorithm may stop much earlier based on the configuration.
C. Batched Offering
As we can see, sequential offering is intuitive and straight-
forward, but its main drawback is the (possibly) large delay
accumulated over multiple rounds of offering. Hence, a natural
generalization is to make multiple offers (i.e., a batch) in each
round and continue offering for multiple rounds. We refer to
it as (sequential) batched offering.
In batched offering, the platform is faced with the general
case of EU maximization in Eq. (23) in each round. Unfortu-
nately, joint optimization can be difficult in practice, mainly
because EU(A,p) is a multi-variate function in the continuous
domain of p given A, and there may not exist structural prop-
erties like concavity in general to enable efficient computation
of the global optimum. Exhaustive search is prohibitive as
the space of p is huge. Fortunately, EU(A,p) has a useful
structural property (i.e., submodularity) in the discrete domain
of A as a set function, which inspires our following pricing
mechanism design.
Lemma 2. Given p, EU(A,p) is submodular in A.
Proof. See Appendix A-B for proof.
The basic idea of our pricing mechanism is to first fix the
pricing rule and then focus on user selection to exploit the
submodularity property. As mentioned in Section IV-A, if a
set function f is nonnegative submodular and the problem
is maxA⊆S f(A), there exist heuristic-based algorithms (e.g.,
Algorithm 1) that provide solutions with performance guar-
antee at low complexity. Next, we will present our pricing
mechanisms for single-batch and multi-batch offering.
1) Single-Batch Offering: As mentioned in Section III, we
consider the following pricing rule in this work: the platform
chooses a desired probability of recruitment γ ∈ (0, 1] such
that γi = min(γ, ρi) for any i ∈ S and determines corre-
sponding prices, i.e.,
pγ(A) =
∑
i∈A
pγ({i}) =
∑
i∈A
F−1Ci (min(γ/ρi, 1)) . (28)
Given pγ(·), user selection then becomes
max
A⊆S
EUγ(A) = max
A⊆S
∑
y
Prγ(Ay)uγ(Ay), (29)
where Prγ(Ay) =
∏
i∈Ay γi ·
∏
i/∈Ay(1 − γi) and uγ(Ay) =
v(Ay)− pγ(Ay). By Lemma 2, EUγ(A) is submodular.
However, the USM formulation also requires the objective
function to be nonnegative, but EUγ(A) can be negative. To
bypass this issue, one straightforward way is to define
EU ′γ(A) = EUγ(A) + p0 (30)
where
p0 =
∑
i∈S
γipγ({i}) (31)
is a constant that represents the maximum expected price,
and adding a constant preserves submodularity. It is easy to
see that EU ′γ(A) is both submodular and nonnegative, and
maxA⊆S EU ′γ(A) is equivalent to maxA⊆S EU
′
γ(A).
Another issue is due to the difficulty of analytically evaluat-
ing EUγ(A) (or EU ′γ(A)), since it involves an exponentially
growing number of terms due to the summation in Eq. (29).
In practice, the Monte-Carlo (MC) method [36] can be used
to obtain estimates of ˆEUγ(A) as well as ˆEU ′γ(A) (by adding
the constant p0 to ˆEUγ(A)). We show that USM(S, ˆEU ′γ) has
the following performance.
Theorem 1. If | ˆEU ′γ(A)−EU ′γ(A)| ≤  for some small  > 0
for any A ⊆ S, USM(S, ˆEU ′γ) (or equivalently USM(S, ˆEUγ))
returns a solution A with the following performance,
EU ′γ(A) ≥
1
3
EU ′γ(OPT )−
1
3
(2n+ 2), and (32)
EUγ(A) ≥ 1
3
EUγ(OPT )− 2
3
p0 − 1
3
(2n+ 2), (33)
where OPT is the optimal solution for maxA⊆S EU ′γ(A) as
well as maxA⊆S EUγ(A), p0 =
∑
i∈S γipγ({i}) and n = |S|.
Proof. See Appendix A-C for proof.
Algorithm 3: Single_Batch_Offering
input : S – set of users, f – ˆEU ′γ(·) (or equivalently
EˆUγ(·)), Γ = [γ1, ..., γl] – candidate γ values
where γ1 < γ2 < ... < γl, pγ(·) – pricing rule
output: A – selected users, p – prices, γ∗ – best
probability of recruitment
1 A← ∅, p← NULL, γ∗ ← 0;
2 foreach γ in [γ1, ..., γl] do
3 Aγ ← USM(S, f );
4 if Aγ = ∅ then break;
5 if EˆUγ(Aγ) > EˆUγ(A) then
6 A← Aγ , γ∗ ← γ;
7 foreach each user i in A do
8 p← [p, pγ∗({i})]
9 return A, p, γ∗;
Algorithm 3 describes the algorithm for single-batch offer-
ing. Since each γ leads to a different solution Aγ , it is better
for the platform to search through a list of l candidate γ values
(e.g. {0.1, 0.2, ..., 1.0}) to find the best one that maximizes
EˆUγ(Aγ). As USM takes O(n) time, the overall complexity
of Algorithm 3 is O(ln).
2) Multi-Batch Offering: In the case of expired or rejected
offers in the previous batch, the platform may send out more
batches until the next batch is no longer profitable.
Denote by EUγ(B|Ay) the marginal EU of additional offers
B conditioned on the set of recruited users Ay,
EUγ(B|Ay) = EY′ [uγ(By′ |Ay)], (34)
where uγ(By′ |Ay) = uγ(By′∪Ay)−uγ(Ay) = v(By′ |Ay)−
pγ(By′) is the marginal utility of By′ given Ay. We can see
from Lemma 2 that EUγ(B|Ay) is again submodular in B.
The algorithm for multi-batch offering is provided in Algo-
rithm 4. Starting from the second batch, the marginal EU func-
tion is passed as an input to Single_Batch_Offering
(Line 3). If the (estimated) marginal EU of B is higher than
a preset threshold τ > 0 (e.g., 0.01), then it is profitable on
Algorithm 4: Multi_Batch_Offering
input : S – set of users, f – ˆEU ′γ(·) (or equivalently
EˆUγ(·)), Γ = [γ1, ..., γl] – candidate γ values
where γ1 < γ2 < ... < γl, pγ(·) – pricing rule, τ
– threshold
output: A – selected users, p – prices, y – outcomes
1 A← ∅, p← NULL, y← NULL ;
2 while A 6= S do
3 (B,pB , γ
∗) ←Single_Batch_Offering(S \
A, f(·|Ay),Γ, pγ(·)) ;
4 if EˆUγ∗(B|Ay) > τ then
5 Send out offers (B,pB) and observe yB ;
6 A← A ∪B, p← [p,pB ], y← [y,yB ]
7 else break;
8 return A, p, y;
average to send out the next batch of offers (Lines 5). The
platform will then wait for the results and update A, p, y
accordingly (Line 6). The offering process stops when (1) there
are no more users to consider (Line 2), or (2) the next batch
is no longer profitable on average (Line 4).
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct simulations to evaluate proposed
pricing mechanisms based on EU maximization, and compare
them against baseline mechanisms based on (best-case) utility
maximization. We also study the impact of offer expiration on
the proposed pricing mechanisms.
A. Simulation Setup
Fig. 3a is a sample topology of 60 users, whose locations are
randomly generated from the spatial Poisson process. The AoI
is a 6km-by-6km region, discretized into a total of 169 points
with a resolution of 450 meters. We assume an exponential
kernel function K(d) = 15.5 ·exp(− d0.7 ), as shown in Fig. 3b,
which is adapted from the semivariogram fitted from real
measurements [9]. Given the above settings, negative marginal
MI values are not observed and α is set to 0.
The domain of Ci is [ci, ci + ∆c], where ∆c > 0 and ci
is randomly generated from U [0.1, 0.2], where U [·, ·] denotes
the uniform distribution. We consider two types of distribu-
tions: uniform (UN) and truncated normal (TN) distributions.
TN is the normal distribution N(ci, (∆c/3)
2) truncated to
[ci, ci + ∆c]. Compared to UN, TN represents the situation
where the majority of users have sensing costs closer to the
energy costs ci, despite of opportunity costs. The same set of
noise variances independently drawn from U [0.5, 1] is used
throughout our simulation.
1) Baseline Mechanisms: As mentioned in Section III, an
alternative to design a pricing mechanism is to maximize
the best-case utility as in Eq. (1), assuming no expired or
rejected offers. In this simulation, we consider single-batch
and multi-batch offering based on utility maximization as
baseline mechanisms. That is, instead of passing ˆEU ′γ(·)
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Fig. 3: (a) Sample topology of 60 users (in red) in a 6km-by-
6km area that is discretized into a mesh grid of 169 points (in
blue). (b) The kernel function K(d) = 15.5 · exp(− d0.7 ).
into USM in each batch (Line 3 of Algorithm 3), we pass
u′γ(·) (a nonnegative submodular function) into USM, where
u′γ(A) = uγ(A) + pγ(S) and uγ(A) = v(A) − pγ(A).
Compared to EU ′γ(·), the objective function u′γ(·) does not
require the MC method and is easy to evaluate.
For convenience, we refer to EU-maximization-based mech-
anisms by feeding ˆEU ′γ(·) to USM as USM-EU, and baseline
mechanisms by feeding u′γ(·) to USM as USM-u.
B. USM-EU vs. USM-u in Single-Batch Offering
In this experiment, we compare the performance of USM-
EU and USM-u in singe-batch offering. ˆEU ′γ(·) is obtained by
averaging over 50 iterations of MC simulations. We randomly
select 30 or 60 users, and set κ in v(·) (Eq. (15)) to 4 or 8,
and ∆c to 0.1 or 0.5. We assume no expired offers and set
ρi = 1 for each user i. We will study the impact of offer
expiration later in Section VI-C3. A total of 30 iterations are
conducted, and a different seed is used for generating users
and cost distributions in each iteration. In the i-th iteration,
however, the same set of users and cost distributions are used
across different γ and mechanisms for fair comparison. Results
are provided in Fig. 4.
In Fig. 4a, we first observe that γ∗ achieving the maximum
averaged EU is less than 1 for both USM-EU and USM-u
under both UN and TN distributions. Intuitively, with a smaller
γ, the platform can save money per user and send out more
offers. Although each offer is less likely to be accepted, the
platform achieves a greater EU on average. Second, at γ = γ∗,
USM-EU achieves a higher EU than USM-u, especially for
UN. Besides, the fact that more money is saved per user under
TN than UN with the same γ explains the observation that both
USM-EU and USM-u achieve a larger EU under TN than UN.
Similar behaviors are observed in Fig. 4b and 4d. But in
Fig. 4c when ∆c is changed from 0.5 to 0.1, the uncertainty
in opportunity costs is reduced and energy costs become more
dominant. In this case, the platform will not save much per
user with a small γ and should choose a larger γ. Besides, we
do not observe the advantage of USM-EU.
Furthermore, as shown in Fig. 4a, USM-EU is slightly better
than USM-u with γ between 0.3 and 0.6 under UN, but their
performance is very close for γ ≤ 0.2 under UN and for all γ
values under TN. This is mainly because in those cases, both
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
γ
0
5
10
15
Av
er
ag
ed
 E
U
EˆU γ(AEU )-TN
EˆU γ(Au)-TN
EˆU γ(AEU )-UN
EˆU γ(Au)-UN
(a) n = 30, κ = 8, ∆c = 0.5
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
γ
0
5
10
15
Av
er
ag
ed
 E
U
EˆU γ(AEU )-TN
EˆU γ(Au)-TN
EˆU γ(AEU )-UN
EˆU γ(Au)-UN
(b) n = 60, κ = 8, ∆c = 0.5
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
γ
0
5
10
15
20
Av
er
ag
ed
 E
U
EˆU γ(AEU )-TN
EˆU γ(Au)-TN
EˆU γ(AEU )-UN
EˆU γ(Au)-UN
(c) n = 30, κ = 8, ∆c = 0.1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
γ
0
2
4
6
Av
er
ag
ed
 E
U
EˆU γ(AEU )-TN
EˆU γ(Au)-TN
EˆU γ(AEU )-UN
EˆU γ(Au)-UN
(d) n = 30, κ = 4, ∆c = 0.5
Fig. 4: Average EU achieved by USM-u and USM-EU for UN
and TN cost distributions under different settings.
mechanisms will send out offers to more or all users (30 max.
in this setting) and thus achieve very close EU. When there are
more users (Fig. 4b), USM-EU is better than USM-u under
both UN and TN for γ < 0.6. With smaller ∆c (Fig. 4c),
USM-EU is less advantageous. With smaller κ (Fig. 4d), each
user is less valuable and USM-u selects fewer users, since
it assumes no expired or rejected offers. In contrast, USM-
EU considers the average-case utility and is more aggressive
in user selection, which explains its better performance than
USM-u with the same small γ.
C. Batched Offering vs. Sequential Offering
In this simulation, we compare the following mechanisms:
• SB-u/EU: single-batch offering with USM-u or USM-EU;
• MB-u/EU: multi-batch offering with USM-u or USM-EU;
• SE: sequential offering.
We randomly select n out of 60 users, and generate a set
of noise variances and cost distributions, which are used in
all iterations for each n. In the i-th iteration, a different set
of sensing costs is independently generated from the cost
distributions and used across different mechanisms for fair
comparison. We set ∆c = 0.5, and varied n, κ or {ρi} to
study their impacts on the average utility achieved by the
platform. All results are averaged over 50 iterations. Due to
space limit, only results for UN distributions are reported, but
similar observations exist for TN distributions.
1) Impact of n (number of users): We first set κ = 4 and
ρi = 1 for each user i (i.e., no expired offers). n is varied from
10 to 60, and results are provided in Fig. 5a. First, we observe
that all mechanisms achieve a higher utility on average as n
increases. Second, if only one batch/round is allowed, USM-
EU achieves the highest utility, since it accounts for possible
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Fig. 5: Comparison of SB-u, MB-u, SB-EU, MB-EU and SE.
(a) Impact of n (κ = 4, no expired offers). (b) Utility vs.
number of batches of offers (n = 60, κ = 4, no expired offers).
(c) Impact of κ (n = 30, no expired offers). (d) Impact of ρ
(n = 30, κ = 4, ρi = ρ for each user i).
expiration and rejection and thus makes more offers in the
first batch. The improvement of USM-EU (i.e., SB-EU) over
USM-u (i.e., SB-u) varies from 8.5% with n = 10 to 40.5%
with n = 60 (Fig. 5a), which means the advantage of SB-EU
(over SB-u) is more obvious with more users. SE performs
the worst, since it only sends out one offer in the first round.
When more batches are allowed (Fig. 5b), all mechanisms
perform better, since it is always beneficial to send out more
batches to make up for expired or rejected offers in the previ-
ous batch. Since USM-EU is very generous in making offers
in the first batch, following batches become less profitable.
If the maximum number of batches is unlimited, USM-u (i.e.,
MB-u) eventually achieves very close performance with USM-
EU (i.e., MB-EU), but the price is a much larger cumulative
delay. For instance, when n = 60, MB-EU and MB-u make
2.5 and 7.7 batches of offers on average. The number is 24.9
for SE, which is the worst.
2) Impact of κ (currency in Eq. (15)): We then fix n = 30
and vary κ from 1 to 6. We set ρi = 1 for each user i.
As shown in Fig. 5c, the average utility obtained by each
mechanism increases as κ increases, because the platform
values per unit MI (log-scaled) more and is able to recruit more
users. Besides, SB-EU is still better than SB-u for different
κ, but its advantage is less obvious when κ gets larger. For
instance, the improvement is 127.1% with κ = 1, but reduces
to 13.4% with κ = 6. Moreover, multi-batch offering is better
than single-batch offering for both USM-EU and USM-u, but
the improvement is more significant for USM-u.
3) Impact of ρ (probability of unexpired offers): We set
n = 30 and κ = 4. For simplicity, we assume ρi = ρ for each
user i and vary ρ from 0.2 to 1. Results are provided in Fig. 5d.
First, we observe that all mechanisms are adversely affected
when ρ decreases. Even though the platform knows ρ and
adjusts the price as in Eq. (28) to achieve γ, i.e., increasing the
acceptance probability to offset the high expiration probability,
it implies higher prices for users and consequently reduced
utility. As mentioned earlier in Section V-B, the best price
for each user in SE does not depend on ρ, but the resulting
marginal EU does. Nevertheless, SE observes the outcome of
the previous offer and continues offering, which explains why
it (as well as multi-batch offering) is more robust against offer
expiration than single-batch offering.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we designed a crowd-sensing system for
spatial-statistics-based radio mapping and developed pricing
mechanisms, i.e., sequential and batched offering, based on EU
maximization. We conducted extensive simulations to evaluate
proposed mechanisms. Our results show that if only one batch
is allowed, the proposed mechanism based on EU maximiza-
tion is significantly better than the utility-maximization-based
baseline mechanism. If multiple batches are permitted (and
the number of batches is unlimited), the proposed mechanism
achieves close performance with the baseline mechanism, but
requires much fewer batches and thus a much smaller delay.
Sequential offering works better than the single-batch baseline
mechanism, but has a much larger cumulative delay. Offer
expiration adversely affected all mechanisms, but sequential
and batched offering are relatively more robust.
APPENDIX A
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Consider two sets A, B such that A ⊆ B ⊆ S and any
i ∈ S \B. Let f(A) = 1+MI ′(A). First, we know that f(A)
is submodular from the submodularity of MI(A), i.e.,
f(A ∪ {i})− f(A) = MI(A ∪ {i})−MI(A) + α
≥MI(B ∪ {i})−MI(B) + α
= f(B ∪ {i})− f(B). (35)
We also know that f(A) is monotone, since MI(A) is α-
approximately monotone and thus
f(A∪{i})− f(A) = MI(A∪{i})−MI(A) +α ≥ 0. (36)
Let a = f(A), b = f(A ∪ {i}), c = f(B), and d = f(B ∪
{i}). From the submodularity and monotonicity of f(·), we
have b − a ≥ d − c ≥ 0 and d ≥ b. Let a′ = b − (d − c) ≥
a. Since log(·) is non-decreasing concave, we have log(b) −
log(a) ≥ log(b) − log(a′) ≥ log(d) − log(c) ≥ 0. Hence,
v(A ∪ {i}) − v(A) ≥ v(B ∪ {i}) − v(B) ≥ 0, and v(·) is
submodular monotone.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
We notice that u(Ay,p) is submodular in Ay given p, since
v(·) is submodular (Lemma 1) and
u(Ay ∪ {i},p)− u(Ay,p) = v(i|Ay)− pi ≥ v(i|B)− pi
≥ u(B ∪ {i},p)− u(B,p) (37)
for Ay ⊆ B ⊆ S and any i ∈ S \ B. Since the class of
submodular functions are closed under taking expectations, it
follows that EU(A,p) is submodular in A given p.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Before proving Theorem 1, we first prove the following
lemma.
Lemma 3. Given a nonnegative submodular function f :
2S 7→ R+ and its estimate fˆ with |fˆ(A)− f(A)| ≤  for any
A ⊆ S and some small  > 0, USM(S, fˆ ) returns a solution
A with the following performance guarantee,
f(A) ≥ 1
3
f(OPT )− 1
3
(2n+ 2) (38)
where OPT = arg maxA⊆S f(A) and n = |S|.
Proof. Our proof is inspired by the proof in [20]. Let us start
with Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ai + bi ≥ −4, where ai =
fˆ(Ai−1∪{ui})−fˆ(Ai−1) and bi = fˆ(Bi−1\{ui})−fˆ(Bi−1).
Proof. Since |fˆ(A)− f(A)| ≤ , ∀A ⊆ S, we have
f(A)−  ≤ fˆ(A) ≤ f(A) + , ∀A ⊆ S. (39)
Notice that (Ai−1 ∪ {ui}) ∪ (Bi−1 \ {ui}) = Bi−1, (Ai−1 ∪
{ui})∩ (Bi−1−ui) = Ai−1. Based on both observations and
submodularity of f , we get
ai + bi = [fˆ(Ai−1 ∪ {ui})− fˆ(Ai−1)]
+ [fˆ(Bi−1 \ {ui})− fˆ(Bi−1)] (40)
≥ [f(Ai−1 ∪ {ui}) + f(Bi−1 \ {ui})]
− [f(Ai−1) + f(Bi−1)]− 4 ≥ −4. (41)
Define OPTi , (OPT ∪Ai)∩ (Bi). Thus, OPT0 = OPT
and the algorithm outputs OPTn = An = Bn. Examine the
sequence f(OPT0), ..., f(OPTn), which starts with f(OPT )
and ends with the f value of the output of the algorithm. The
idea is to bound the total loss of value along this sequence.
Lemma 5. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have
f(OPTi−1)− f(OPTi) ≤ [fˆ(Ai)− fˆ(Ai−1)]
+ [fˆ(Bi)− fˆ(Bi−1)] + 2. (42)
Proof. W.L.O.G., we assume that ai ≥ bi, i.e., Ai ← Ai−1 ∪
{ui}, Bi ← Bi−1 (the other case is analogous). Notice that
in this case OPTi = (OPT ∪ Ai) ∩ Bi = OPTi−1 ∪ {ui},
Bi = Bi−1 and fˆ(Bi) = fˆ(Bi−1). Hence, the inequality we
need to prove is that
f(OPTi−1)− f(OPTi−1 ∪ {ui})
≤ [fˆ(Ai)− fˆ(Ai−1)] + 2 = ai + 2 (43)
We now consider two cases. If ui ∈ OPT , then the left-hand
of the inequality is 0, and all we need to show is that ai ≥ −2.
This is true since ai+bi ≥ −4 by Lemma 4, and we assumed
ai ≥ bi.
If ui /∈ OPT , then also ui /∈ OPTi−1, and thus
f(OPTi−1)− f(OPTi−1 ∪ {ui}) ≤ f(Bi−1 \ {ui})− f(Bi−1)
≤ fˆ(Bi−1 \ {ui})− fˆ(Bi−1) + 2 = bi + 2 ≤ ai + 2. (44)
The first inequality follows by submodularity: OPTi−1 =
((OPT∪Ai−1)∩Bi−1) ⊆ (Bi−1\{ui}) (recall that ui ∈ Bi−1
and ui /∈ OPTi−1). The second and third inequalities follow
from Eq. (39) and our assumption that ai ≥ bi, respec-
tively.
Summing up Lemma 5 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have
n∑
i=1
[f(OPTi−1)− f(OPTi)]
≤
n∑
i=1
[fˆ(Ai)− fˆ(Ai−1)] +
n∑
i=1
[fˆ(Bi)− fˆ(Bi−1)] + 2n. (45)
The above sum is telescopic and we have
f(OPT0)− f(OPTn) ≤ [fˆ(An)− fˆ(A0)] + [fˆ(Bn)− fˆ(B0)] + 2n
≤ fˆ(An) + fˆ(Bn) + 2n ≤ f(An) + f(Bn) + (2n+ 2)
(46)
By our definition, OPT0 = OPT and OPTn = An = Bn.
Then we obtain that f(OPT ) ≤ 3f(An) + (2n + 2) and
f(An) = f(Bn) ≥ 13f(OPT )− 13 (2n+ 2).
Now let us prove Theorem 1. By Lemma 3, we have
EU ′γ(A) ≥ 13EU ′γ(OPT ) − 13 (2n + 2), where OPT =
arg maxA⊆S EU ′γ(A), which is also the optimal solution
to maxA⊆S EUγ(A). By definition of EU ′γ(A), we obtain
EUγ(A) + p0 ≥ 13 [EUγ(OPT ) + p0] − 13 (2n + 2) and
EUγ(A) ≥ 13EUγ(OPT )− 23p0 − 13 (2n+ 2).
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